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I. INTRODUCTION 
The quest for limited liability in business enterprises and 
transactions has been a driving force in the development of 
business organization law for centuries.  The historical 
development of corporations and limited partnerships evidences 
this primary goal.  The recent development of the modern forms of 
limited liability partnerships and limited liability companies proves 
that this quest continues unabated.  In addition, parties to 
significant business transfer transactions have long sought by 
construct and contract to apportion and limit their respective legal 
responsibilities and liabilities. 
Counterbalancing this inexorable trend toward limited liability 
has been the penchant of common law jurisprudence to define its 
limits.  Common law theories of piercing the corporate veil and 
successor liability, among others, have been developed and 
expanded by the courts as equitable restraints on the strength of 
business limited liability protections, making these protections 
more akin to presumptions than unassailable principles. 
If, as the famous aphorism goes, “hard cases make bad law,”1 
then hard business cases provide a recipe for Hungarian goulash.2  
So it is with the entrée recently served up by the Minnesota courts 
in a series of substantive trial court determinations and three 
reported appellate decisions, culminating in the Minnesota 
Supreme Court’s recent en banc report of Johns v. Harborage I, Ltd.. 3  
Here’s how the recipe goes.  Start with one business enterprise, 
Gators Bar and Grill (“Gators”) located in the Mall of America 
shopping center.  Chop that business into three legally distinct 
parts, all with intertwined relationships: a limited partnership that 
leases the business premises, holds the liquor license, and owns the 
operation’s physical assets; a second limited partnership that 
provides management services to the business; and a corporation 
that supplies employees to the business.  Add one sexual 
harassment victim with a valid but unsatisfied judgment against the 
corporate piece of the business.  Separately arrange a transfer of 
 
 1. N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904) (Holmes, J., 
dissenting). 
 2. “An eclectic and uncoordinated mixture of something.” ENCARTA WORLD 
ENGLISH DICTIONARY [N. AM. ED.] at http://encarta.msn.com/dictionary_ 
1861614774/goulash.html? (last visited July 20, 2004). 
 3. 664 N.W.2d 291 (Minn. 2003) (Gilbert, J., dissenting) [hereinafter Johns 
III]. 
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the assets of the first limited partnership, not found to be liable on 
the harassment verdict, to a distinct, unrelated corporation, from 
which satisfaction of the harassment judgment ultimately is sought.  
Cover with a combination of both federal and state common and 
statutory law.  Combine all ingredients together and sprinkle 
liberally with equitable considerations.  The result is, as with many 
other culinary creations, at least interesting.  Whether or not one 
finds it appealing or appetizing is, as in all matters of this kind, 
dependant on one’s personal (legal) tastes. 
This article seeks to make sense of the recipe and the ultimate 
concoction that is Johns v. Harborage I, Ltd. (collectively “Johns”).4  
The legal substance of the case involves the use by business parties 
of devices to limit their liabilities.  Part II describes the 
development of limited liability entities (“LLEs”), and the use of 
limited liability transactions, such as those employed by the 
defendants in Johns, as well as exceptions to the applicable 
presumptions of limited liability.5  Part III parses the facts and 
history of the multiple Johns decisions.6  Part IV explains and 
explores the rulings in Johns in light of the legal and equitable 
principles surrounding the evolution of business limited liability 
and its exceptions.7 
II. LIMITED LIABILITY ENTITIES AND TRANSACTIONS AND THEIR 
LIMITS 
Businesses and their owners regularly seek to limit the scope of 
their liabilities.  After all, the less liabilities a business has to pay or 
assume, the greater the potential for profit for the owners in the 
operation of the business.  There are two distinct ways in which 
these business liabilities may be limited.  First, entrepreneurs may 
take advantage of various state laws to create some form of limited 
liability entity under which the business will operate.  These 
entities, such as traditional corporations and the newer limited 
liability companies, have a legal existence separate from the owner 
of the business and presumptively shield the owner from personal 
obligation for the business debts.  In the business context, this 
might be referred to as “entity-based limited liability.” 
 
 4. Id. 
 5. See infra Part II. 
 6. See infra Part III. 
 7. See infra Part IV. 
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Second, when two businesses engage in a transaction, such as a 
purchase and sale of business assets, they may seek contractually or 
structurally to limit the obligations of the transferee business for 
the obligations of the transferor.  This method of limiting 
transactional liability attempts to have the price paid by the 
transferee for the acquired assets reflect only the obligations 
explicitly assumed.  In the business context, structuring 
transactions so as to identify and minimize assumed and potential 
liability can be referred to as “transaction-based limited liability.” 
Both of these methods of business liability limitation were 
employed in Johns and both were challenged by the plaintiff. 
A. The Development and Limits of Limited Liability Entities 
Much of the history of the development of business 
organization law relates to attempts to create the perfect legal 
vehicle for business purposes.  Until the early to mid-1800s, 
legislation in both England and the U.S. imposed strict limits on an 
owner’s ability to incorporate and to receive the benefits of limited 
liability.8 Incorporation typically required a special act of 
Parliament or a state legislature.9  State legislatures enacting 
general corporation statutes usually imposed substantial limitations 
on corporations, including minimum paid-in capital requirements, 
limited permissible purposes, and limited duration.10  As 
corporations began to dominate the economic landscape, however, 
legislatures removed nearly all of the original limitations on the 
ability of corporations to organize and operate.11 
Following the Industrial Revolution, the development of 
capital markets depended on limited liability protection.  Capital-
intensive businesses required substantial expenditures beyond the 
means of the typical entrepreneur, necessitating the infusion of 
outside investment.12  Providing limited liability to those who 
 
 8. See Kenneth K. Luce, Trends in Modern Corporation Legislation, 50 MICH. L. 
REV. 1291, 1293 (1952) (describing how "corporate charters were difficult and 
expensive to obtain, the fruit of special privilege"); see also Morton J. Horwitz, 
Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory, 88 W. VA. L. REV. 173, 208 
(1986) ("It is not usually appreciated that truly limited shareholder liability was far 
from the norm in America even as late as 1900."). 
 9. HARRY G. HENN & JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS 24-25 (3d 
ed. 1983). 
 10. See id. at 25-26. 
 11. See id. at 26-32. 
 12. See generally HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW 1836-
4
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contributed capital encouraged investment because people could 
invest without risking their full personal net worth.  Although 
investors may be willing to risk their entire net worth in businesses 
they operate themselves, they are not willing—absent limited 
liability—to invest in businesses that they do not operate or closely 
oversee.  Limited liability enabled venture capitalists and casual 
investors to invest in diverse enterprises without incurring the 
excessive costs necessary to monitor each enterprise closely.13  More 
broadly, this grant of limited liability to investors advanced national 
economic policies by encouraging a broader base of participants in 
business investment.14 
Corporate law, while securing this limited liability, provides 
that corporate power must be exercised according to certain 
mandatory rules that “govern defined issues in a manner that 
cannot be varied by corporate actors.”15  Most importantly, all 
corporations presumptively must have a board of directors that acts 
as the central governance group.16  Ownership is legally separate 
from control.  The owners/shareholders elect a board of directors 
 
1937, 49-55 (1991) (describing post-industrial era shift toward limited liability for 
shareholders calculated to facilitate infusion of capital into new businesses). 
 13. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC 
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 41-43 (1991) (reasoning that limited liability 
encourages investor diversification and discourages close monitoring of each 
individual investment). 
 14. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder 
Liability for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879, 1879 (1991) (observing that limited 
liability "creates incentives for excessive risk-taking by permitting corporations to 
avoid the full costs of their activities"); David W. Leebron, Limited Liability, Tort 
Victims, and Creditors, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1565, 1566 (1991) (describing "the 
traditional corporate and economic justifications for limited liability" as "the need 
to encourage investment in productive, albeit risky, activities"). 
 15. Melvin Avon Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 
1461, 1461 (1989) (footnote omitted) (concerning “the legal rules that directly 
concern the internal organization of the corporation and the conduct of 
corporate actors”); see Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 
89 COLUM. L. REV. 1549, 1553-54 n.16 (1989) (enumerating Delaware's mandatory 
rules).  But cf. Roberta Romano, Answering the Wrong Question: The Tenuous Case for 
Mandatory Corporate Laws, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1599, 1599-602, 1616 (1989) 
(contesting Professor Gordon in part and arguing that although many 
"mandatory" rules may be avoided, some may be desirable "when externalities are 
present"). 
 16. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2001) (stating that a board of 
directors is required unless otherwise provided in certificate of incorporation); 
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01 (1999) (establishing that board of directors is 
required unless all shareholders agree to nontraditional form of governance); 
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.03 (1999) (stating number and election of directors 
required). 
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that makes business policy and manages the corporate enterprise,17 
resulting in a representative, as opposed to democratic, governance 
structure.  Beyond choosing the directors and acting on certain 
extraordinary matters, corporate ownership and involvement in 
business decisions and transactions is presumptively passive. 18 
The development of the corporate entity was parallel to the 
development of the limited partnership.19  Situated as a hybrid 
between the classic general partnership and the corporation, a 
limited partnership has at least one general partner, who, like all 
partners in a regular general partnership, must have unlimited 
personal liability.  The rest of the partners can be limited partners 
who, like their corporate shareholder counterparts, do not have 
personal liability for the debts of the enterprise. 
In essence, the premise for allowing corporate limited liability 
is continued in the limited partnership.  Limited partners, like 
shareholders in the corporation, have no management rights and 
no personal liability.  They trade their involvement in management 
for the security of limited liability.  General partners, on the other 
 
 17. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2001); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 
8.01(b) (1999) (establishing that business and affairs of corporations shall be 
managed by or under direction of board of directors).  Corporate law requires 
shareholders to elect the board of directors through regularly scheduled annual 
elections.  See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(b) (2001) ("[A]n annual meeting 
of stockholders shall be held for the election of directors on a date and at a time 
designated by or in the manner provided in the bylaws."); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 
7.01(a) (1999) ("A corporation shall hold a meeting of shareholders annually at a 
time stated in or fixed in accordance with the bylaws."). To provide accountability, 
perpetual directorships are often banned.  See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 
13, at 3 (noting that "states almost uniformly forbid perpetual directorships"). 
 18. The main downside with the use of the corporate form has been its 
unattractive tax treatment.  A corporation is subject to double taxation: it is taxed 
once as an entity, and its shareholders are taxed on distributions of dividends, 
which are treated as ordinary income.  See I.R.C. § 301-381 (2002) (imposing a 
double tax on corporations). 
 19. Several of the entities involved in Johns were limited partnerships.  Johns 
III, 664 N.W.2d 291, 293 (Minn. 2003).  New York ushered in the first limited 
partnership statute in 1822 and soon other jurisdictions began adopting this 
business form. Louisiana is the exception.  See R. Kurt Wilke, Note, Limited 
Partnership Control: A Reexamination of Creditor Reliance, 60 IND. L.J. 515, 516-18 
(1985).  In 1916, the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws drafted the Uniform 
Limited Partnership Act, which was subsequently enacted by nearly every state.  Id.  
In 1976, the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws approved a Revised Uniform 
Limited Partnership Act, which most jurisdictions adopted.  Id. at 524-28,  n.60.  A 
new revised Act has recently been promulgated and has been adopted by many 
states, including Minnesota in 2004.  2004 Minn. Laws ch. 199 (codified as 
amended at MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 323A.1-01- 323A.12-03 (West 2003)). 
6
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hand, like directors and officers of a corporation, have 
management authority but also some level of personal liability. 
All in all, however, the standard limited partnership was only a 
partial solution in the search for the perfect form of business 
organization.  While limited partners in limited partnerships could 
enjoy the security of limited liability, a general partner still 
remained subject to unlimited liability.  In addition, the traditional 
connection between management authority and personal liability 
continued. 
As the next and much more recent development of business 
organization law, the limited liability company (“LLC”) 
represented a significant step in the breakdown of the trade-off of 
investor passivity for limited liability.  Causing a minor business 
revolution over the past several decades,20 the LLC was created out 
of whole cloth.21  The LLC represented a new hybrid to the 
business entity montage.  Unlike a limited partnership in which a 
general partner has personal liability to third parties for the 
recourse debts of the business, all owners of an LLC enjoy limited 
liability—no owner bears personal responsibility for LLC debts.22 
In addition, most LLC codes derive from a partnership 
organizational framework, with presumptive management by the 
 
 20. Some commentators early on questioned the LLC as a continuing form of 
business entity.  See, e.g., Karen C. Burke, The Uncertain Future of Limited Liability 
Companies, 12 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 13, 16 (1995). 
 21. In 1977, Wyoming adopted the first modern LLC act in the United States.  
See Wyoming Limited Liability Company Act, ch. 158, 1977 Wyo. Sess. Laws 537 
(codified as amended at WYO. STAT. ANN. 17-15-101 to -144 (2003)).  The LLC 
concept was introduced in Germany in 1892 by a law authorizing the formation of 
the private limited company, the Gesellschaft mit beschrankter Haftung ("GmbH," 
or LLC).  See Kristin A. DeKuiper, The European Limited Liability Company - A 
Comparison of the Czech, Slovak and German Examples with the New American Entity, 1 
PARKER SCH. J. E. EUR. L. 291, 291 (1994).  The limited partnership association, 
adopted in Pennsylvania, Michigan, New Jersey, and Ohio in the 1870s, was 
arguably the LLC's unsuccessful ancestor.  See Wayne M. Gazur & Neil M. Goff, 
Assessing the Limited Liability Company, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 387, 393-94 (1991) 
(examining the implications and ramifications of the limited liability company).  
In fact, the 1977 Wyoming statute utilized some language from the Ohio limited 
partnership association statute.  See id. at 395.  Florida followed with LLC 
legislation in 1982.  Id.  Presently, all states have some version of LLC legislation. 
 22. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS'NS § 4A-301 (2003) ("Except as 
otherwise provided . . . no member shall be personally liable for the obligations of 
the limited liability company . . . ."); N.J. STAT. ANN. 42:2B-23 (West Supp. 1996) 
("Except as otherwise provided . . . the debts, obligations and liabilities of a limited 
liability company, whether arising in contract, tort or otherwise, shall be solely the 
debts, obligations and liabilities of the limited liability company . . . no member . . 
. shall be obligated personally . . . ."). 
7
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owners/members.23  The common link in each of the LLC statutes 
is either presumptive or optional management by the owners.  The 
concept of separating management authority from ownership is 
gone.  No longer is managerial passivity the price that must be paid 
for limited liability. 
Finally, the development of the “limited liability partnership” 
or “registered limited liability partnership” (jointly “LLP”) as the 
newest form of LLE highlights the breakdown of the final barriers 
between passive investors and active managers.  An LLP is first and 
foremost a general partnership wherein the partners both own and 
manage the business.  Like the general partnership, there is no 
separation between the partners’ roles as investors and as 
managers.  Almost as an aside, LLP statutes usually contain a one-
paragraph provision restricting the limited liability of a LLP’s 
owners if appropriate documentation is filed with the state.24 
In sum, today the traditional purposes for limited liability, 
those of promoting passive investment and encouraging capital 
development, have broadened. Legislatures’ purposes have 
expanded from merely encouraging and protecting passive 
investors to simply and actively promoting business.  The limited 
liability of corporate and limited partnerships promotes investment 
and capital development, while new LLE forms, such as the limited 
liability company and limited liability partnership, expect owner 
involvement in running the business.  This combination of active 
management and presumptive limited liability that typifies the 
modern closely held business organization is well represented by 
the entities employed by the initial defendants in the Johns matter. 
B. Traditional Piercing and Enterprise Entity Limits of Limited Liability 
Despite the proliferation of limited liability business entity 
forms, American law governing business limited liability has had a 
 
 23. See Gazur & Goff, supra note 21 (assessing the LLC form); Robert R. 
Keatinge et al., The Limited Liability Company: A Study of the Emerging Entity, 47 BUS. 
LAW. 375 (1992) (comparing LLCs to other business organization forms and 
analyzing state LLC statutes). 
 24. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. §§ 323A.3-06(c), 323A.10-01 (2002).  By combining 
limited liability for general partners with the well-established partnership law 
foundation, LLP legislation produced renewed interest in the partnership form.  
The LLP is a solution for participants seeking a partnership structure with active 
control but limited liability.  Any thought of having to forego active involvement in 
the business in order to obtain the protection of limited liability has been 
eliminated. 
8
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contentious history.  In the 1800s, Thomas Cooper described 
limited liability as a “mode of swindling, quite common and 
honourable in these United States” and “a fraud on the honest and 
confiding part of the public.”25  Yet, early in the twentieth century, 
President Butler of Columbia University acclaimed business limited 
liability as “the greatest single discovery of modern times” and that 
“even steam and electricity are far less important than the limited 
liability corporation, and they would be reduced to comparative 
impotence without it.”26 
The decisions of the courts have reflected the ambivalence 
that pervades the policy of allowing business LLEs.  Use of the 
corporate or other limited liability form for the operation of a 
business presumptively shields the personal assets of the 
owners/shareholders from the claims of the business’s creditors.27  
A court may be asked to ignore this liability shield when a voluntary 
or involuntary creditor finds the corporation unable to pay its 
debts.  The creditor would then like the court to disregard or 
“pierce” the statutory limited liability shield so that the debts of the 
business might be satisfied out of the owners/shareholders’ assets, 
personal or otherwise.  Absent a judicial decision to “pierce the 
veil” in this manner, the limited liability created by the applicable 
corporate statute stays intact and the creditor must shoulder the 
loss. 
Therefore, the most typical way in which courts reflect the 
policy ambivalence over limited liability is by “piercing the veil” of 
the LLE to hold the owners of a business personally liable for the 
business debts.  This is the classic form of “piercing” and operates 
vertically to hold the owner liable for the debts of the business.28 
 
 25. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, supra note 12, at 50 (quoting THOMAS COOPER, 
LECTURES ON THE ELEMENTS OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 247, 250 (2d ed. 1830)) 
(footnote omitted). 
 26. STEPHEN B. PRESSER, PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL § 1.1, at 1-5 (2004) 
(citation omitted). 
 27. See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.22(b) (1999) ("Unless otherwise 
provided in the articles of incorporation, a shareholder of a corporation is not 
personally liable for the acts or debts of the corporation . . . .").  See generally John 
H. Matheson & Brent A. Olson, A Call for a Unified Business Organization Law, 65 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 5-9 (1996). 
 28. To provide guidance on when the owner of a limited liability entity will 
lose the benefit of limited liability, the place to start should be with the courts' 
experiences over the years dealing with this issue in the corporate context.  This is 
not as helpful as one might think; the “tests” used by courts to determine whether 
to pierce the limited liability veil are universally recognized as unhelpful.  See, e.g., 
PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS: PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS IN 
9
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An alternative form of LLE veil piercing is of a horizontal 
nature, typically involving brother/sister or sibling corporations.  
As will be explored in more detail later, this is the nature of the 
piercing analysis employed by the courts in Johns.  Sometimes a 
single business enterprise is set up using separate and multiple 
limited liability entities, operating on the same level and having the 
same owners and/or managers.  The claim of horizontal piercing 
asks the court to ignore the separate legal existences of the sibling 
corporations and pierce their veil so that the assets of all related 
entities are available to satisfy creditor claims.  The theory is that 
the separate entities are simply parts of one unified business 
enterprise and that the legal analysis should reflect that operational 
reality. 
 
THE LAW OF PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS 8 (1983) (suggesting that court 
decisions are "irreconcilable and not entirely comprehensible"); ROBERT CHARLES 
CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 72 (1986) ("[T]he courts usually forgo any sustained 
attempt at a remedial theory or even a coherent exposition of the basis of liability, 
although descriptive summaries are occasionally attempted."); EASTERBROOK & 
FISCHEL, supra note 13, at 54-55 ("[T]ests used by courts--whether a corporation 
has a 'separate mind of its own,' whether it is a 'mere instrumentality,' and so forth-
-are singularly unhelpful.").  The courts employ at least three conclusory "tests": 
(1) the "agency" test under which the plaintiffs must establish that the 
parent exercised a significant degree of control over the subsidiary's 
decisionmaking; 
(2) the "alter ego" test which is founded in equity and permits the court 
to pierce the corporate veil when the court must prevent fraud, illegality 
or injustice, or when recognition of the corporate entity would defeat 
public policy or shield someone from liability from a crime; 
(3) the "instrumentality" test under which the plaintiff must establish that 
the parent exercises extensive control over the acts of the subsidiary 
giving rise to the claim of wrongdoing; and 
(4) the "integrated enterprise" test under which the court considers (a) 
interrelation of operations, (b) centralized control of labor relations, (c) 
common management, and (d) common ownership or financial control. 
Richard v. Bell Atl. Corp., 946 F. Supp. 54, 61 (D.D.C. 1996) (citations omitted). 
Application of these tests often consists largely of lists that the courts recite with 
little analysis or justification.  Some courts list as many as nineteen factors.  See, e.g., 
Laya v. Erin Homes, Inc., 352 S.E.2d 93, 98-99 (W. Va. 1986) (listing 19 factors).  A 
sample list from one court recites "insufficient capitalization for purposes of 
corporate undertaking, failure to observe corporate formalities, nonpayment of 
dividends, insolvency of debtor corporation at time of transaction in question, 
siphoning of funds by dominant shareholder, nonfunctioning of other officers 
and directors, absence of corporate records, and existence of corporation as 
merely a façade for individual dealings."  Minnesota Power v. Armco, Inc., 937 F.2d 
1363, 1367 (8th Cir. 1991).  According to that court, an unspecified number of 
these factors, combined with an element of "injustice or fundamental unfairness," 
would justify disregarding the corporation and holding the owners liable.  Id. 
10
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CARLTON
Seon Cab Corp. Cab Company 2 Cab Company 3 
The classic cases of this nature involve the taxicab industry.29  
In Walkovszky v. Carlton,30 for example, a businessman, Carlton, 
owned a taxicab business that he set up by creating ten separate 
corporations, each of which owned two cabs and had one driver.  
As simplified, the structure of this business is set out in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: Entities Comprising Taxicab Business 
 
The plaintiff, Walkovszky, was severely injured when struck by 
a taxicab owned by Seon Cab Corp. (“Seon”), but Seon’s assets 
were insufficient to satisfy the judgment.  At that point plaintiff had 
two ways to argue for piercing the corporate veil: traditional vertical 
piercing to hold Carlton personally liable as Seon’s owner, or 
horizontal piercing between the separate cab companies so as to 
aggregate their assets and increase the pool of assets available for 
satisfaction of the judgment. 
As to the traditional vertical piercing claim against Carlton 
individually, the court in Walkovszky concluded that the complaint 
was deficient because it was “barren of any ‘sufficiently 
particular(ized) statements’ . . . that the defendant Carlton and his 
associates are actually doing business in their individual capacities, 
shuttling their personal funds in and out of the corporations 
‘without regard to formality and to suit their immediate 
convenience.’”31  However, the court concluded that the plaintiff 
might succeed on a horizontal piercing claim.  Walkovszky alleged 
that “[a]lthough seemingly independent of one another, these 
corporations are alleged to be ‘operated . . . as a single entity, unit 
and enterprise’ with regard to financing, supplies, repairs, 
 
 29. See, e.g., Mangan v. Terminal Transp. Sys., 284 N.Y.S. 183 (N.Y, Sup. Ct. 
1935), aff’d, 286 N.Y.S. 666 (N.Y. App. Div. 1936) (involving a parent corporation 
that owned four taxicab entities and one entity that hired drivers).  Other 
industries are also represented.  See, e.g., My Bread Baking Co. v. Cumberland 
Farms, Inc., 233 N.E.2d 748 (Mass. 1968). 
 30. 223 N.E.2d 6 (N.Y. 1966). 
 31. Id. at 420 (internal citations omitted). 
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employees and garaging, and all are named as defendant.”32  Thus, 
the separate existence of the ten business entities operating as 
individual taxicab companies under common ownership might be 
“pierced” and their assets aggregated into one judicially reformed 
legal entity for purposes of liability.  As the Court analyzed the 
situation it clearly distinguished vertical from horizontal piercing: 
In the case before us, the plaintiff has explicitly alleged 
that none of the corporations “had a separate existence of 
their own” and, as indicated above, all are named as 
defendants. However, it is one thing to assert that a 
corporation is a fragment of a larger corporate combine 
which actually conducts the business.  It is quite another 
to claim that the corporation is a “dummy” for its 
individual stockholders who are in reality carrying on the 
business in their personal capacities for purely personal 
rather than corporate ends.  Either circumstance would 
justify treating the corporation as an agent and piercing 
the corporate veil to reach the principal but a different 
result would follow in each case. In the first, only a larger 
corporate entity would be held financially responsible while, 
in the other, the stockholder would be personally liable. 
Either the stockholder is conducting the business in his 
individual capacity or he is not. If he is, he will be liable; if 
he is not, then, it does not matter—insofar as his personal 
liability is concerned—that the enterprise is actually being 
carried on by a larger “enterprise entity.”33 
This theory of horizontal piercing is sometimes referred to as 
the “enterprise entity” or “enterprise liability” theory of judicial veil 
piercing and entity reformation.  The label comes from a famous 
article by Adolph Berle, where he posits that: 
[a]nother illustration of judicial erection of a new entity 
occurs in situations where the corporate personality (as 
embodied in its charter, books and so forth) does not 
correspond to the actual enterprise, but merely to a 
fragment of it.  The result is to construct a new aggregate 
of assets and liabilities.  The decisions disregard the paper 
corporate personalities and base the results on the assets 
of the enterprise.34 
 
 32. Id. at 416. 
 33. Id. at 418-19 (citations omitted). 
 34. Adolph Berle, Jr., The Theory of Enterprise Entity, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 343, 348 
(1947). 
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C. Transactional Limitation of Liability: Asset Transfers 
The concept of transactionally limiting business liability is 
initially very straightforward.  Indeed, it is a concept that we all use 
and rely upon on a daily basis.  For example, if I own an 
automobile and you want to buy it from me, all we have to do is 
agree on price and any other relevant terms and then I will give you 
the keys to the car and you will pay me for it.  The result is a 
transfer of assets for valid consideration. 
Assume that in addition to having an automobile for sale, I 
also have an outstanding balance on an unsecured loan from a 
financial institution that I took out to finance the original purchase 
of the car.  If you buy my automobile from me, are you responsible 
for the loan as well?  Of course not—unless you agree to be. 
A similar analysis applies to transfers of assets between 
businesses.  If one business owns real property or personal 
property, or has intangible property rights, such as intellectual 
property, franchise, or contract rights, those assets are 
presumptively transferable to another business entity without the 
transferee incurring any obligations not voluntarily assumed as part 
of the transaction.  The analysis becomes slightly more complicated 
when, instead of a discrete asset being transferred between 
businesses, one business basically wants to acquire the total 
operations of another company.  This is what businesspersons and 
lawyers refer to as the stuff of “mergers and acquisitions,” or M&A, 
for short. 
As a starting point, there are various ways in which one 
business can acquire another.  One common method is for the 
business to be acquired, often referred to as the “target,” to merge 
into the acquiring business (or a subsidiary).  A merger occurs 
when two or more business entities combine to produce a single 
entity (the “surviving” entity) pursuant to a merger plan.35  If one 
business decides to acquire another company through direct 
absorption, a “two-party” merger takes place. The acquiring entity 
 
 35. Mergers can be direct or indirect, depending upon the presence of a 
subsidiary.  When a corporation is merged directly into the acquiring corporation, 
only the acquiring corporation survives the merger.  With "triangular" mergers, a 
corporation merges with a newly formed subsidiary of the acquiring corporation 
and the surviving corporation becomes a subsidiary of the acquiring corporation.  
A transaction constitutes a "merger" regardless of whether the corporation 
surviving the merger is a previously existing operating corporation or is a new 
corporation formed solely for the purpose of surviving the merger. 
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(A) gives the existing owners of the target company (T) cash, stock 
or other property in order to purchase the target business.  The 
transaction looks like Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2: Merger of Two Business Entities 
 
 When a merger becomes effective, a number of significant 
changes occur simultaneously.  Primarily, only the surviving entity 
continues in existence, eliminating the separate existence of the 
constituent organizations.  The two businesses literally and legally 
become one.  As a result, the surviving entity has all of the 
privileges, powers, property, rights, and other interests of each of 
the constituent entities.36  More significantly for the current 
discussion, the surviving entity becomes liable for all liabilities and 
obligations of all constituent organizations, and claims or 
proceedings against a constituent company may be pursued against 
the surviving entity.37  Therefore, quite literally, the assets and 
liabilities of the constituent organizations become merged into and 
the responsibility of the surviving entity.  To continue with our 
 
 36. With respect to mergers of Minnesota corporations, see, for example, 
Minnesota Statutes section 302A.641, subdivisions 2(a) and 2(c) (2002). 
 37. As to Minnesota corporations, see, for example Minnesota Statutes 
section 302A.641, subdivision 2(e) (2002). 
T A 
S 
(T+A) 
T = TARGET ENTITY 
A = ACQUIRING ENTITY 
= DIRECTION OF ASSETS AND 
LIABILITIES POST MERGER 
S = SURVIVING ENTITY RESULTING 
FROM T AND A MERGER 
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automobile and loan sales transaction analogy posited earlier, in a 
merger, the surviving entity gets both the car and the loan. 
Given that a merger necessarily results in acquisition of all of 
the liabilities as well as the assets of the target entity, businesses 
seeking to make acquisitions sometimes seek an alternative 
transactional structure that allows selectivity with respect to the 
liabilities assumed.  This alternative structure is the asset transfer.  
In an asset transfer, the two constituent organizations exchange 
operational assets for cash or other consideration, but do not 
merge and do not become a single entity.  Each business starts as a 
separate entity and each business survives as a distinct entity with its 
own separate existence after the asset transfer.  An asset transfer 
between two businesses looks like Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3: Asset Transfer Between Business Entities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Legally, the distinction between a merger and an asset transfer 
is monumental.  With the former, the acquiring entity has no 
choice in selecting among the target’s assets and liabilities.  The 
acquirer succeeds to the amalgam of the two original entities.  With 
the latter, however, the acquiring entity can selectively choose 
which assets and which, if any, liabilities it wants to acquire.  Quite 
literally, the acquiring entity can take the car without acquiring any 
obligation for the loan.  Moreover, even if liabilities will be assumed 
as part of an asset transfer transaction, the specific obligations 
assumed can be separately identified and priced.  That is, the 
consideration paid for the acquired assets (and possibly liabilities) 
T A 
  = DIRECTION OF ASSETS (NOT 
LIABILITIES) POST TRANSFER 
 
     = DIRECTION OF  
CONSIDERATION FOR ASSET     
ACQUISITION 
 
T = TRANSFEROR ENTITY 
 
A = ACQUIRING ENTITY
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will reflect the basket of items acquired.  Therefore, at least from 
the liability minimization perspective, an asset acquisition is a much 
more favorable transactional acquisition structure than a merger. 
D. Successor Liability as a Basis for Expanding Transactional Liability 
The basic legal rule of liability in an asset transfer is that a 
purchaser or other transferee of business assets from another 
business entity is not responsible for the debts and obligations of 
the transferring entity.  For example, the Minnesota Business 
Corporation Act (“MBCA”) expressly provides that a transferee of 
substantially all of the assets of a Minnesota corporation is liable for 
the debts, obligations, and liabilities of the transferor only to the 
extent contractually assumed by the transferee or otherwise 
provided in the MBCA or by other Minnesota Statutes.38 
This legislative directive has generally been followed by 
Minnesota courts. For example, in product liability cases decided 
since section 302A.661, subdivision 4, was enacted, courts have 
found no successor liability in part because of the Minnesota 
legislation and in part because prior Minnesota case law also 
limited such liability.  In Niccum v. Hydra Tool Corp.,39 the court, in 
 
 38. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.661, subd. 4 (West 2003 & Supp. 2004). 
 39. 438 N.W.2d 96, 99 (Minn. 1989).  One of the exceptions to successor 
liability noted by the Niccum court is the doctrine of de facto merger.  Id. at 98.  
Minnesota jurisprudence on de facto merger is still developing.  According to the 
Minnesota Federal District Court, the Minnesota Court of Appeals has applied a 
multi-factor analysis to determine whether a de facto merger occurred: 
(1) Whether there is a continuation of the enterprise of the seller 
corporation, so that there is a continuity of management, personnel, 
physical location, assets and general business operation. 
(2) Whether there is a continuity of shareholders which results from the 
purchasing corporation paying for the acquiring asset with shares of its 
own stock, this stock ultimately coming to be held by the shareholders of 
the corporation so that they become a constituent part of the purchasing 
corporation. 
(3) Whether the seller corporation ceases its ordinary business 
operations, liquidates and dissolves as soon as legally and practically 
possible. 
(4) Whether the purchasing corporation assumed the obligation of the 
seller ordinarily necessary for the continuation of normal business 
operations of the seller corporation. 
Gamradt v. Fed. Labs., Inc., No. 02CV816JMR/RLE, 2003 WL 22143729, at *3 (D. 
Minn. Sept. 2, 2003) (citations omitted).  The Federal District Court adopted the 
Minnesota Court of Appeals’ analysis of de facto merger and predicted that the 
Minnesota Supreme Court, given the opportunity, would adopt it as well.  Id. at *4; 
see Fine v. Schwinn Cycling Fitness, Inc., No. C3-00-1079, 2000 Minn. App. LEXIS 
16
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affirming summary judgment in favor of a transferee corporation, 
noted that section 302A.661, subdivision 4, indicates the Minnesota 
legislature’s intent to limit any extension of successor liability.  In 
Everest v. American Transportation Corp.,40 an Arkansas corporation 
purchased assets from another Arkansas corporation and 
continued to manufacture the same products as the transferor at 
the same plant with many of the same employees that the 
transferor had used.  In a suit relating to a death allegedly resulting 
from the negligent design and manufacture of the product by the 
corporation’s transferor, the U.S. District Court for Minnesota 
granted summary judgment to the transferee on grounds that 
Minnesota does not impose liability on a transferee even if it 
engages in essentially the same manufacturing operations as the 
transferor.41 
Despite this general rule, state courts have traditionally applied 
four exceptions to the presumption of non-liability of transferees.  
These exceptions are: 
Generally where one corporation sells or otherwise 
transfers all of its assets to another corporation, the latter 
is not liable for debts and liabilities of the transferor, 
except: (1) where the purchaser expressly or impliedly 
agrees to assume such debts; (2) where the transaction 
amounts to a consolidation or merger of the corporation; 
(3) where the purchasing corporation is merely a 
continuation of the selling corporation; and (4) where the 
transaction is entered into fraudulently in order to escape 
liability for such debts. 42 
In addition, both the statute itself and the Reporter’s Notes 
establish that the statute does not override transferee liability under 
federal and state statutes.43  As discussed in detail below, it is the 
 
1292, at *6-7 (Minn. Ct. App.  Dec. 26, 2000) (unpublished) (explaining 
multifactor merger test). 
 40. 685 F. Supp. 203 (D. Minn. 1988). 
 41. Id. at 207-08. 
 42. J.F. Anderson Lumber Co. v. Myers, 296 Minn. 33, 37-38, 206 N.W.2d 365, 
368-69 (1973) (citing with approval 15 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER 
CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 7122 (perm. ed., rev. vol. 
2004)); see Costello v. Unipress Corp., No. C6-95-2341, 1996 WL 106215, at *1 
(Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 12, 1996).  Language in those cases suggests that section 
302A.661, subdivision 4, would not protect a transferee from liability for transfers 
effected fraudulently to escape liability for the transferor’s obligations. 
 43. Minnesota Statutes section 302A.661, subdivision 4, states that the 
transferee is liable for the transferor’s obligations to the extent provided in other 
Minnesota statutes.  The Reporter’s Notes to § 302A.661, subd. 4, recite that 
17
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interplay of this federal and state liability in the asset transfer 
context that is an important aspect of the Johns decisions in the 
Minnesota appellate courts. 
 
III. JOHNS V. HARBORAGE I, LTD. 
A. The Facts and Preliminary Decisions 
In 1993, Lori Johns worked as a server at Gators Bar and 
Restaurant at the Mall of America.44  Ms. Johns was sexually 
harassed by a coworker while working there in February of 1993.45  
One month later, Ms. Johns resigned from her position at Gators,46 
and on January 14, 1994, she filed unlawful discrimination charges 
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”).47  
In June 1995, the EEOC issued Ms. Johns a right-to-sue notice.48   
On September 15, 1995, she filed a sexual harassment suit against 
Gators in Minnesota District Court under both Title VII of the 
Federal Civil Rights Act49 and section 363.01 of the Minnesota 
Human Rights Act (“MHRA”).50 
At the time of the sexual harassment in 1993, Gators was 
operated by three legal entities.  FPM, Ltd. (“FPM”) was a Texas 
limited partnership formed in May 1992,51 that leased the Gators 
premises from the Mall of America Company, held the liquor 
license,52 and owned all the furniture, fixtures, equipment and 
inventory.53  Harborage I, Ltd. (“Harborage I”) was a Texas limited 
 
“federal statutes may preempt this statute in certain areas of liability.”  REPORTER’S 
NOTES—1981 TO SECTION 302A.661 OF THE MBCA, at 298, 2003-04 Special 
Pamphlet, 298 (2003) reported in WEST’S MINNESOTA CORPORATION, LIMITED 
LIABILITY COMPANY, AND PARTNERSHIP LAWS (2004-05). 
 44. Johns III, 664 N.W.2d 291, 292 (Minn. 2003). 
 45. See Johns v. Harborage I, Ltd., 585 N.W.2d 853, 856 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998) 
[hereinafter Johns I]. 
 46. Id. at 857. 
 47. Id.  Ms. Johns also filed charges with the Minnesota Human Rights 
Department (MHRD), but for the purposes of this comment, the EEOC charges 
are the only relevant charges.  Johns III, 664 N.W.2d at 293. 
     48.    See infra Part III-A. 
 49. 42 U.S.C. § § 2000e to 2000e-16c (2000). 
 50. Johns III, 664 N.W.2d at 293.  See also MINN. STAT. § 363.01 (2002) 
(currently codified at MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363A.04 (West 2003)). 
 51. Charles W. Greener Aff. ¶ 6. 
 52. Johns III, 664 N.W.2d at 293. 
 53. Id. at 300. 
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partnership formed in December 1991,54 that provided 
management services to Gators55 (and at least seven other bars)56 as 
a general contractor.57  Harborage, Inc. was a Texas corporation 
incorporated in 198658 that provided employees for Gators and 
issued paychecks to Gators’ employees59 as a subcontractor.60  All 
three businesses shared the same offices in Dallas, Texas and all 
three shared ties to both Charles W. Greener and Joyce O. 
McReynolds.61 
Ms. Johns originally brought her employment discrimination 
suit against Harborage, Inc.,62 the company that issued the checks 
for her work.  Harborage, Inc. initially admitted to being Johns’s 
employer.63  In July 1996, defense counsel requested that Johns 
amend her complaint to list Harborage I as her employer.  Johns 
made this change.  Then in October 1996, defense counsel advised 
Johns that Harborage, Inc. was actually her employer at the time of 
her harassment, so the parties stipulated to a change in the 
complaint again.  One month later, Harborage, Inc. filed for 
 
 54. Greener Aff. ¶ 4. 
 55. Johns III, 664 N.W.2d at 293. 
 56. Patrick B. Hennessy Aff. of May 14, 2001, Ex. 4 at 12 (Asset Purchase 
Agreement Disclosure Schedule 3(g): Benefit Plans). 
 57. Greener Aff. ¶ 10. 
 58. Johns III, 664 N.W.2d at 293. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Greener Aff. ¶ 10. 
 61. Johns III, 664 N.W.2d at 293.  The Charles W. Greener Trust was the sole 
shareholder of Main Event, Inc. (“Main Event”) which in turn, held thirty-nine 
percent of FPM and one hundred percent of Harborage, Inc., outright.  William J. 
Morris Aff. of 2/20/97, Ex. F at 11 (Intoxicating Liquor or Wine License 
Application).  Through Harborage, Inc., Main Event also held 99% of FPM.  Johns 
I, 585 N.W.2d at 860.  McReynolds held the positions of President, Vice-President, 
Secretary, Treasurer and sole Director in: (1) Harborage, Inc., (2) Harborage 
Services, Inc. (the general partner in FPM), (3) FPM I, Inc. (the general partner in 
FPM), and (4) Main Event, Inc.  Johns I, 585 N.W.2d at 859.  When FPM was 
formed, Leon Carroll signed as President of both Harborage I and Harborage 
Services, Inc. (“Harborage Services”).  Id.  However in 1995, when Harborage, Inc. 
transferred its interest as a limited partner in FPM to AFSC Services I, Ltd., 
McReynolds signed as the President of Harborage, Inc. and Harborage Services.  
Id.  Greener states in his affidavit that he took over as President of Harborage, Inc. 
in 1996.  Greener Aff. ¶ 1.  In the application for a liquor license that she 
submitted to the City of Bloomington, Minnesota, McReynolds listed herself as 
Main Event’s sole director, and the holder of “All Offices.”  Morris Aff., Ex. F. at 
11.  Greener, on the other hand, stated that Main Event was a holding company 
with no employees.  Greener Aff. ¶ 3. 
 62. Johns I, 585 N.W.2d at 857. 
 63. Id. 
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bankruptcy protection.64  Ms. Johns then filed a motion to amend 
her complaint to name Harborage I and FPM as defendants, which 
the district court granted.65 
On September 8, 1997, following a bench trial, the district 
court concluded that Harborage, Inc. and Harborage I was a 
simple integrated enterprise,66 each of which could be considered 
Ms. Johns’s employer for purposes of her lawsuit, and that they had 
submitted Ms. Johns to a hostile work environment based on her 
sex.67  The district court awarded damages, including punitive 
damages and attorney fees, to Ms. Johns against Harborage I.68  The 
district court however, dismissed all claims against FPM stating only 
that: “Defendant FPM, Ltd., while sharing some common 
ownership, was only the lessee and holder of the liquor license at 
Gators, but not involved in management or labor relations to a 
degree sufficient to be considered plaintiff’s employer.” 69 
Before the district court judgments were entered, Jillian’s 
entered into an asset purchase agreement (“APA”) with FPM, Ltd. 
and other entities, to purchase the assets of Gators and two other 
bars at the Mall of America.70  In May 1998 the APA closed.71 In the 
APA, Jillian’s agreed to assume certain liabilities of the sellers, but 
the lawsuit involving Ms. Johns was not one of those liabilities.72  
After all, this made sense since FPM had been dismissed by the 
district court from lawsuit with Ms. Johns.  It would have indeed 
been odd if the parties had made specific reference to this matter. 
At the same time, Jillian’s entered into a Transition Services 
 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id.  This whole exchange between the parties seems strange and possibly 
less than honest.  But neither the court of appeals nor the supreme court 
addresses this issue directly. 
 66. Id. at 858. 
 67. Id. at 857. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Johns v. Harborage I, Ltd., No. PI. 95-17129, at ¶ 53 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Sept. 
8, 1997) (district court’s findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order for 
judgment). 
 70. Johns v. Harborage I, Ltd., 645 N.W.2d 761, 763 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002) 
[hereinafter Johns II]. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id.  The APA did not specifically mention the lawsuit with Johns.  
Harborage I was not a party to the APA, but $3.7 million of the purchase price 
went to pay management fees that would have been payable to Harborage I up 
until shortly before the transaction.   Johns v. Harborage, Inc., No. PI 95-17129 at 4 
(Minn. Dist. Ct. Sept. 30, 2000) (district court memorandum).  FPM I, Inc. 
received $352,491 of those management fees.   Hennessy Aff., Ex. 2 at 1. 
20
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Agreement (“TSA”) with Harborage I so that Harborage I would 
continue to provide administrative and labor services to Gators 
until certain employees could be transferred to Jillian’s payroll.73  
Jillian’s commenced operating Gators without substantial change.  
It retained the same name, location, supervisors, managers, 
employees, uniforms, pay, benefit, décor, menu, furniture, and 
equipment.74 
In February 1998, Harborage I appealed the district court 
ruling.75  In November 1998, the court of appeals affirmed the 
district court ruling, except as to punitive damages, and later 
awarded Ms. Johns appellate attorney fees.76 In March of 1999, 
while attempting to collect on her judgment, Ms. Johns discovered 
that Harborage I could not satisfy any of the judgment because its 
assets had been liquidated.77  As a result, Ms. Johns moved to add 
Jillian’s as a defendant to her complaint on the theory of successor 
liability.78  On September 30, 2000, the district court granted Ms. 
Johns’s motion to add Jillian’s as a defendant. 79 
Ms. Johns then moved for summary judgment against Jillian’s 
as a successor to the defendants already found liable in the action.80  
Jillian’s filed a cross motion for summary judgment, objecting to 
the procedure by which it was made a party to the action81 and 
denying succession of Harborage I.82  The district court granted Ms. 
Johns’s motion for summary judgment on the grounds that: (1) 
 
 73. Johns II, 645 N.W.2d at 763. 
 74. Johns III, 664 N.W.2d at 294. 
 75. Johns II, 645 N.W.2d at 763. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Johns III, 664 N.W.2d at 293.  Ms. Johns attempted to enforce her 
judgments against Harborage I, but discovered in March that Harborage I had 
liquidated itself, retaining only de minimis assets located outside of Minnesota.  Id.  
According to one of Ms. Johns’s attorneys, Patrick B. Hennessy of Best and 
Flanagan, Harborage I used the gross income it received through management 
fees to pay its managers’ salaries.  Telephone Interview with Patrick B. Hennessy, 
Partner, Best and Flanagan (May 19, 2004).  Harborage I’s only assets were 
computers and desks which Harborage I liquidated by auction.  Id.  Ms. Johns was 
unable to locate the proceeds from that auction.  Id. 
 78. Johns II, 645 N.W.2d at 763.  Harborage I did not oppose the motion to 
amend the complaint to include Jillian’s as a defendant.  Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. While the Minnesota Supreme Court addressed this issue in its opinion, 
this article assumes that the Minnesota Supreme Court ruled correctly when it 
found permissible the procedure used in adding Jillian’s to the complaint in this 
case. 
 82. Johns II, 645 N.W.2d at 764. 
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“the effect, if not the intent,” of the APA was to block collection of 
a valid judgment; (2) Jillian’s was aware of the “vital role” 
Harborage I played in the operation of Gators; (3) the same 
management personnel remained following Jillian’s purchase; and 
(4) Jillian’s knew well its potential liability.83  The district court 
ordered the judgments amended to add Jillian’s as a judgment 
debtor.84  The court of appeals reversed, finding that Jillian’s was 
not a successor of Harborage I.85 
B. The Supreme Court Opinion 
In an en banc decision, the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed 
the court of appeals rulings and held that the classification of 
Jillian’s as Harborage I’s successor was correct.86  As stated by the 
majority, the issue at the heart of the case was “whether Jillian’s can 
be considered a successor employer for purposes of enforcing the 
judgment obtained against Harborage I.”87 
Significantly, the court held that under Minnesota corporate 
law, Jillian’s was not liable to Ms. Johns.88  When Ms. Johns sought 
to enforce the judgment against Harborage I, she was unable to 
collect because the employer’s assets had been liquidated, and Ms. 
Johns then sought a judgment against Jillian’s.89  The supreme 
court held that purchasers of corporate assets are liable only to the 
extent provided for by contract, and, therefore, Jillian’s did not 
have successor corporation liability under Minnesota’s corporate 
law.90  Because Jillian’s had only agreed to assume certain specified 
liabilities (which did not include discrimination claims) under the 
APA and TSA, the court ruled that, under Minnesota Statutes 
section 302A.661, subdivision 4, Jillian’s was not liable for the 
judgment as a successor to the former Gators entities.91 
The Minnesota Supreme Court ruled, however, that the 
protection against transferee liability under Minnesota Statutes 
section 302A.661, subdivision 4, does not apply to successor liability 
 
 83. Johns III, 664 N.W.2d 291, 294 (Minn. 2003). 
 84. Johns II, 645 N.W.2d at 764. 
 85. Id. at 767. 
 86. Johns III, 664 N.W.2d at 299 (Gilbert, J., dissenting). 
 87. Id. at 296. 
 88. Id. at 297. 
 89. Id. at 293-94. 
 90. Id. at 297. 
 91. Id. 
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applicable to Title VII claims.92  The court rejected Jillian’s 
argument that federal successor liability could not extend beyond 
state successor liability, recognizing that federal successor liability is 
federal common law, independent from state law.93  
Acknowledging, however, that the U.S. Supreme Court has not 
ruled on the issue of whether successor liability applies to Title VII 
cases, the court noted that the federal circuits uniformly apply 
successor liability to Title VII cases and concluded that this 
application is proper in light of the nature and goal of Title VII.94 
After justifying its application of federal successor liability to 
the Johns case, the court analyzed the particular facts of Johns under 
the two pronged inquiry it outlined: whether there existed 
continuity of the business and whether Jillian’s as a successor had 
notice of the underlying claims by Ms. Johns.95  The court 
concluded that the undisputed facts showed a substantial 
continuity of business operations.96  In examining the continuity of 
business operations, the Minnesota Supreme Court considered the 
entire Gators restaurant as the business.97  The court argued that 
even though the owners of Gators were free to “unbundle the 
business into as many legal entities as they choose, the policies that 
underlie Title VII cannot be avoided by attempting to confine the 
‘employer’ function to a limited entity that has no purpose 
independent of the business as a whole.”98  Under the federal 
doctrine, the court did not focus on the formalities of the APA or 
TSA; rather it focused on the fact that the buyer basically 
continued the business with no change in management, location, 
or other attributes.  Noting that the location and people remained 
the same, the court ruled that, as a matter of law, the continuity of 
the business had been established.99 
 
 92. Id. at 299. 
 93. Id. at 298. 
 94. See id.  The court cites other cases extending federal successor employer 
liability to Title VII cases.  See EEOC v. G-K-G, Inc., 39 F.3d 740, 747-48 (7th Cir. 
1994); EEOC v. Vucitech, 842 F.2d 936, 945 (7th Cir. 1988); In re Nat’l Airlines, 
Inc., 700 F.2d 695, 698 (11th Cir. 1983); Dominguez v. Hotel, Motel, Rest. & Misc. 
Bartenders Union Local # 64, 674 F.2d 732, 733 (8th Cir. 1982); Trujillo v. 
Longhorn Mfg. Co. Inc., 694 F.2d 221, 224-25 (10th Cir. 1982); Slack v. Havens, 
522 F.2d 1091, 1094-95 (9th Cir. 1975). 
 95. See Johns III, 664 N.W.2d at 299-300. 
 96. Id. at 299. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
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With regard to the notice requirement, the court noted that 
Jillian’s did not contend that it lacked notice of the judgment 
against Harborage I.100  In fact, Jillian’s hired employees who were 
involved in the litigation with Ms. Johns, including Harborage I’s 
human resources director, who was an active member of the 
litigation.101  Based on this, the court ruled that Jillian’s was aware 
of the judgment for Ms. Johns and had the opportunity to take that 
judgment into account when bargaining for Gators.102  The court 
ruled that Jillian’s had the proper notice required for successor 
liability to attach.103  As a result, Johns III met both prongs of the 
federal test the Minnesota Supreme Court outlined and the court 
added Jillian’s to the judgment.104 
The dissent took issue with the majority’s successor liability 
analysis.105  The dissent argued Jillian’s was not a successor to the 
defendant, Harborage I.106  While the dissent admitted that the U.S. 
Supreme Court does not distinguish between mergers, 
consolidations, and asset transfers in applying federal successor 
liability, the dissent argued that all of the case law applying the 
doctrine involves at least one of those three types of transfers.107  
The dissent asserted that since Harborage I and Jillian’s were not 
involved in any of those types of transfers, they did not have a 
predecessor to successor relationship.108  The dissent further 
argued that by naming Jillian’s a successor, the district court and 
the Minnesota Supreme Court were essentially overturning the 
previous district court ruling that held that FPM was not liable to 
 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 299-300. 
 102. Id. at 300. 
 103. Id.  Because a judgment had already been entered in the case, the 
requirement for filing an EEOC claim was clearly met.  Johns had to file the EEOC 
claim before she could bring a suit against Harborage I.  Id. at 295-96. 
 104. Id. at 300. 
 105. The dissent agreed with only three propositions the majority set forth.  
First, Justice Gilbert agreed that Minnesota corporate law did not make Jillian’s 
liable as a successor.  Id.  Second, he agreed that federal successor liability did not 
distinguish between the types of asset transfers when examining successor liability.  
Id.  Third, he agreed that federal successor liability applied to labor law issues.  Id. 
at 300-03.  The dissent took issue with the procedure used to join Jillian’s as a 
defendant in the case.  Id. at 303.  This comment focuses solely on the federal 
successor liability issue; hence, it will not discuss or address the dissent’s 
arguments on the procedure used to join Jillian’s. 
 106. See id. at 301-02 (Gilbert, J., dissenting). 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
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Ms. Johns.109  Finally, according to the dissent, the majority had 
imposed a dramatic new risk on those who would acquire the assets 
of an ongoing business that will result in an unwieldy increase in 
buyers’ due diligence investigations attempting to protect against 
that risk.110 
IV. UNDERSTANDING THE LIMITS OF LIMITED LIABILITY IN JOHNS 
The rulings by the Minnesota Supreme Court in Johns III 
implicate both entity-based limited liability and transaction-based 
limited liability.  Jillian’s could not be held liable to Ms. Johns 
unless Jillian’s was found to have some connection with the entity 
that was John’s employer at the time of the unlawful 
discrimination, that is, Harborage, Inc.  This determination 
requires an analysis of entity-based limited liability and its 
enterprise entity exception.  In addition, even if some relationship 
existed between Jillian’s and Ms. Johns’s former employer, Jillian’s 
must be found to be the employer’s successor.  This second 
determination requires an analysis of transaction-based limited 
liability and its successorship limitations.  Only by exploring these 
two pieces separately can the conclusions in Johns III be understood 
and considered for their ultimate merits. 
Consider the quandary of the Minnesota courts as the Johns 
case progressed.  Remember that the Gators business originally was 
separated into discrete pieces, as illustrated by Figure 4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 109. Id. at 301-02.  The dissent argued that by finding successor liability, the 
court was denying the separate legal existence of the various entities created to 
operate Gators.  Id. at 301.  According to the dissent, the majority created a new 
rule that as long as the owners of various entities benefited from a transaction, 
those entities could be considered as one entity.  Id. 
 110. Id. at 300.  After arguing that the method of transfer did not support the 
application of federal successor liability, the dissent further argued that the 
remedy sought by Johns did not support the application of the doctrine either.  Id. 
at 302.  The dissent made the point that the federal successor employer doctrine is 
an equitable doctrine and cases where courts employed it involved at least some 
equitable relief.  Id.  In the present case, the dissent argued that there were no 
equitable principles involved because Johns only sought monetary damages.  See id.  
The dissent claimed that neither equitable nor legal principles supported a 
finding of successor liability in Johns and as a result, the Court should not have 
named Jillian’s as a successor liable to Johns.  Id. 
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McReynolds and Greener
Harborage, Inc. Harborage I,
Ltd.
FPM, Ltd.
Figure 4: Entities Comprising Gators Restaurant 
 
 
Initially, the district court was faced with a valid discrimination 
lawsuit against one of those pieces, Harborage, Inc., which had 
been identified as Ms. John’s employer.111  On the eve of trial, 
Harborage, Inc. filed for bankruptcy protection.112  To deal with 
this conundrum, the district court determined that Harborage, Inc. 
and Harborage I, Ltd. were so interrelated in the labor relations 
aspect of the Gators business that they could both be treated as Ms. 
Johns’s “employer” for purposes of liability under Title VII.113  At 
the same time, the district court determined that FPM, Ltd. was not 
sufficiently interrelated so as to be considered Ms. Johns’s 
employer.114  These initial determinations by the district court were 
based on Title VII federal law concepts of who is an “employer.”115 
Believing that it had supplied Ms. Johns with a viable remedy 
through its use of the joint employer or integrated employer 
doctrine under Title VII, the district court entered judgment for 
Ms. Johns against both Harborage, Inc. and Harborage I, Ltd., but 
not against FPM, Ltd.116  But that was not the end of the saga.  
When Ms. Johns attempted to collect on her judgment, she 
discovered that Harborage I could not satisfy her judgment because 
 
 111. Johns I, 585 N.W.2d 853, 857 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998). 
 112. Id. 
 113. Johns III, 664 N.W.2d at 293. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id.  There is and was a substantial jurisprudence under Title VII allowing 
more than one entity to be treated as the employer if there is a sharing of 
employment related functions.  See, e.g., Stephen F. Befort, Labor Law and the 
Double-Breasted Employer: A Critique of the Single Employer and Alter Ego Doctrines and a 
Proposed Reformulation, 1987 WIS. L. REV. 67 (1987);  Mark Crandley, The Failure of 
the Integrated Enterprise Test: Why Courts Need to Find New Answers to the Multiple-
Employer Puzzle in Federal Discrimination Cases, 75 IND. L.J. 1041 (2000); Gina M. 
Delahunt, Pointing Fingers—Will the Real Employer Please Stand Up!  When is an Entity 
an Employer in a Sexual Harassment Claim?, 7 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 501 
(2003).  The district court did not rely on common law horizontal veil piercing to 
bring in Harborage I and exonerate FPM. 
 116. Johns II, 645 N.W.2d 761, 762-63 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002). 
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its assets had been liquidated.117  Despite the best efforts of Ms. 
Johns, her attorneys, and the district court, Ms. Johns was still left 
without a viable defendant to satisfy her judgment. 
Ms. Johns moved to add Jillian’s as a defendant to her 
complaint on the theory of successor liability.118  The district court 
granted Ms. Johns’s motion and ultimately found Jillian’s 
responsible.119 
A. Analysis of the Entity Piercing Determination 
Before Ms. Johns could successfully get to Jillian’s assets, 
however, she somehow had to connect Jillian’s to Harborage, Inc. 
or Harborage I, the entities determined to be Ms. Johns’s joint or 
integrated “employer.”  That is, she had two separate hurdles to 
cross to get a remedy against Jillian’s.  First, Ms. Johns had to 
convince the courts to create a link among all of the original Gators 
entities, including FPM.  Second, Ms. Johns needed the courts to 
find that Jillian’s was the successor of that redefined amalgam. 
The problem for Ms. Johns and the courts was that Jillian’s 
connection with the original employer, Harborage, Inc., was non-
existent.  Jillian’s connection with Harborage I was by way of the 
TSA, whereby Harborage I simply agreed to provide administrative 
and labor services to Gators until certain employees could be 
transferred to Jillian’s payroll.120  Jillian’s connection with FPM was 
by way of the asset purchase agreement.  Figure 5 illustrates the 
separate relationships of Jillian’s with Harborage I and with FPM, 
the remaining solvent entities that had been the original Gators 
operation. 
 
 
 
 117. Johns III, 664 N.W.2d at 293. 
 118. Johns II, 645 N.W.2d at 763.  Harborage I did not oppose the motion to 
amend the complaint to include Jillian’s as a defendant.  Id. 
 119. Johns III, 664 N.W.2d at 294; Johns v. Harborage, Inc., No. 95-17129, at 3-4 
(Minn. Dist. Ct. Sept. 30, 2000) (district court memorandum).  The district court 
added Jillian’s as a defendant on the grounds that: (1) Jillian’s knew well its 
potential liability, (2) the effect, if not the intent, of the APA was to block 
collection of a valid judgment, (3) Jillian’s was aware of the vital role Harborage I 
played in the operation of Gators, (4) Harborage I had other ties to the Sellers, 
and (5) Harborage I’s principals (Greener and McReynolds) benefited 
substantially from the sale while avoiding valid judgment debt.  Johns v. 
Harborage, Inc., No. 9517129, at 6 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Sept. 30, 2000) (district court 
memorandum). 
 120. Johns II, 645 N.W.2d at 763. 
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Figure 5: Jillian’s Actual Relationship with Gators Entities 
 
 
Under traditional successor liability principles, the asset 
purchase agreement between Jillian’s and FPM provided the most 
substantial basis for some connection between Jillian’s and the 
three entities originally involved in the Gators operation.  That is, 
common law courts had sometimes found successor liability in the 
asset transfer context despite an attempt by the parties to limit the 
transferee’s liability.121  The problem in Johns was that FPM 
previously had been absolved from liability, at least to the extent of 
not being considered to be Ms. Johns’s “employer” under the Title 
VII joint or integrated employer doctrine.   The courts needed 
some way to combine the operations of Harborage I and FPM. 
Despite the finding by the district court that FPM was not Ms. 
Johns’s employer for Title VII purposes, the supreme court did find 
a basis for tying Harborage I and FPM together as one entity.  The 
theory applied was the common law enterprise entity theory of 
horizontal piercing in the entity-based limited liability context. 
The supreme court refused to view Harborage I and FPM as 
separate entities.122  According to the supreme court, they were 
functionally both pieces of the same business operation, that is, 
Gators Bar and Grill.123  That is, no matter who the employer was, the 
business as a on-going concern necessitated inclusion of all the 
pieces, including FPM.  “Although Greene [sic] and McReynolds 
were free to unbundle the business into as many legal entities as 
they choose, the policies that underlie Title VII cannot be avoided 
by attempting to confine the ‘employer’ function to a limited entity 
that has no purpose independent of the business as a whole.  Greene [sic] 
and McReynolds were only able to operate Gators by joining the 
efforts of all of the related entities.”124 
 
 121. See supra text accompanying notes 38-43. 
 122. Johns III, 664 N.W.2d at 299. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. (emphasis added). 
JILLIAN’S 
HARBORAGE I 
(TSA)
FPM, Ltd.
(APA)
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  Harborage, Inc./ Harborage I,  Ltd./
 
FPM, Ltd.
    
According to the supreme court, Harborage, Inc., Harborage 
I, and FPM while ostensibly separate legal entities, were 
functionally one business operation.125  The legal framework had to 
be reconstructed to fit the practical and operational reality.  The 
language from Adolph Berle’s famous 1947 article on horizontal 
piercing fits precisely: 
Another illustration of judicial erection of a new entity 
occurs in situations where the corporate personality (as 
embodied in its charter, books and so forth) does not 
correspond to the actual enterprise, but merely to a 
fragment of it.  The result is to construct a new aggregate 
of assets and liabilities . . . .  The decisions disregard the 
paper corporate personalities and base the results on the 
assets of the enterprise.126 
Therefore, according to the supreme court, the appropriate 
way to view the Gators pre-Jillian’s organizational structure is 
illustrated by Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6: The Horizontally Combined Entities Comprising Gators 
Restaurant 
 
McReynolds and Greener 
 
 
    
Just like the historic situations involving taxicab companies, the 
separate existences of the three entities that originally comprised 
Gators were horizontally pierced to become one legally reformed 
business entity. 
Justice Gilbert’s dissent took the majority to task on the issue 
of horizontally combining the separate entities that comprised 
Gators.127  According to Justice Gilbert: 
The foundation for the majority opinion made at the 
district court is full of fault lines that should not be 
 
 125. Id. 
 126. Adolf A. Berle, Jr., The Theory of Enterprise Entity, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 343, 
348 (1947). 
 127. Johns III, 664 N.W.2d at 300-03 (Gilbert, J., dissenting). 
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expanded upon by this court. 
 . . . . 
This reasoning is problematic for a number of reasons.  It 
ignores the separate, valid and legal existence of the 
various entities.  Moreover, this rationale is used to pierce 
the separate independent veil of each entity because “the 
principals benefited” from the sale.  A new legal theory 
has been created in Minnesota, which appears to abolish 
the distinction between separate legal entities as long as 
the principals of the various entities benefited from the 
transaction.  Again, the majority fails to cite to authority 
for this major new proposition.128 
Justice Gilbert seems to be right in part.  Johns III does appear 
to be the first time the Minnesota Supreme Court has adopted, 
albeit inartfully, the enterprise entity theory of horizontal veil 
piercing among business entities.  In response, however, the 
supreme court majority might have said that this theory is not so 
novel, but rather is the well-worn enterprise entity or horizontal 
piercing theory of corporate law, and that the authority for this not 
so new and not so major proposition comes from Adolph Berle and 
the taxicab cases. 
In any event, Minnesota now has support for horizontal veil 
piercing from its highest court.  As Justice Gilbert aptly summarized 
the supreme court majority’s enterprise entity horizontal piercing 
analysis: 
[this] legal theory ignores the fact that these separate 
companies were long in existence and were not set up to 
defraud the appellant or anyone else. Appellant was only 
hired by, worked for, and harmed in the employment 
context by Harborage I.  Now, long after the appellant has 
left the employment and lost in the first go-around in 
court against FPM, the district court has successfully 
bundled up all of these separate business entities to make 
each one liable for the debts of the others.129 
The legal entity had been reformed to reflect the practical 
 
 128. Id. at 301. 
 129. Id. at 301-02.  Justice Gilbert knew what this meant for Jillian’s: “By 
concluding that Jillian's is liable to the appellant as a successor-employer, the 
district court ignored the fact that FPM was only the seller of these assets and had 
been previously absolved of any responsibility by this same district court and now 3 
years after the initial decision, attributes liability to ‘the Jillian defendants.’”  Id. at 
302. 
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reality of the business enterprise. 
B. State and Federal Successor Liability—One Step Forward and One Step 
Back 
The next step to ultimately holding Jillian’s liable to Ms. Johns 
was to determine if Jillian’s was a successor to the combined Gators 
entities, Haborage, Inc., Harborage I, and FPM.  The supreme 
court’s analysis on this point consists of two parts: first, successor 
liability under state law, that is, the MBCA, and second, successor 
liability under federal Title VII employment discrimination law.130  
Each of these parts deserves separate consideration. 
1. The Rationalization of Minnesota Successor Liability Law 
Maybe the most significant aspect of the Johns III decision in 
the supreme court was its clarification and narrowing of successor 
liability under Minnesota corporate law.  As discussed above,131 the 
presumption is that, in a transfer of business assets context, the 
transferee is not liable for the transferor’s obligations except to the 
extent explicitly assumed.  Historically, the courts had created four 
common law exceptions to this presumption, such as where there 
was an implied assumption of debts, a de facto merger, a mere 
continuation of the transferring enterprise, or the transaction was 
entered into fraudulently.132 
In 1981, when the then-new MBCA was adopted, the 
legislature tried to significantly restrict the application of common 
law successor liability under Minnesota law.  Minnesota Statutes 
section 302A.661, subdivision 4, provides simply that “[t]he 
transferee is liable for the debts, obligations, and liabilities of the 
transferor only to the extent provided in the contract or agreement between 
the transferee and the transferor or to the extent provided by this chapter or 
other statutes of this state.”133  Therefore, the intent was to 
presumptively limit transferee liability to those liabilities voluntarily 
assumed in the asset transfer contract itself.  The only stated 
exception was for statutory law, that is, “to the extent provided by this 
chapter or other statutes of this state.”134  No room was left for 
 
 130. Id. at 298. 
 131. See supra text accompanying notes 35-43. 
 132. See supra text accompanying note 42. 
 133. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.661, subd. 4 (West 2003) (emphasis added). 
 134. Id. (emphasis added). 
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application of the four common law (as opposed to statutory) 
exceptions that had previously been applied by the courts.135 
This intent to effectively limit transferee liabilities to those 
explicitly assumed and those legislatively mandated, thereby 
eliminating the common law jurisprudence in this area (and the 
four common law exceptions), is echoed in several places.  The 
report to the Minnesota legislature prepared by the Advisory Task 
Force, the drafting body for the MBCA, states that section 302A.661 
“reflects current law with respect to sales of assets except that 
subdivisions 3 and 4 are new.  They permit . . . the restriction of 
successor liability to liabilities imposed by the agreement of transfer 
[and] by other statutes, such as Article 6 of the U.C.C.”136  Similarly, 
the Reporter’s Notes to section 302A.661, included at the time of 
the adoption of the MBCA, provide that “[s]ubdivision 4 of this 
section is aimed at limiting civil liabilities of transferors assumed by 
transferees to those agreed to between the parties or imposed by law, even if 
the transferee is operating the corporation in exactly the same manner as it 
was operated by the transferor.”137 Nevertheless, despite this apparently 
clear legislative intent to restrict state successor liability, the 
Minnesota Court of Appeals and the Minnesota federal courts 
continued to apply the four common law exceptions to transferee 
non-liability even after adoption of the MBCA.138 
 
 135. J.F. Anderson Lumber Co. v. Myers, 296 Minn. 33, 37-38, 206 N.W.2d 365, 
368-69 (1973) (citing 15 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE 
LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 7122 (perm. ed. 1992 & Supp. 2004)).  The J.F. 
Anderson court stated that the judicially imposed exception for a “continuation of 
the selling corporation” did not apply solely because a purchaser carries on the 
same business of the seller but instead applies primarily to reorganizations of a 
corporation under federal or state statutes.  Id. 
 136. REPORT TO THE SENATE BY THE ADVISORY TASK FORCE ON CORPORATION LAW, 
2003-04 Special Pamphlet, at 64 (2004), reported in WEST’S MINNESOTA 
CORPORATION, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, AND PARTNERSHIP LAWS (2004-2005). 
 137. REPORTER’S NOTES—1981 TO SECTION 302A.661 OF THE MBCA, 2003-04 
Special Pamphlet, at 297-98 (emphasis added), reported in WEST’S MINNESOTA 
CORPORATION, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, AND PARTNERSHIP LAWS (2004-2005). 
 138. See, e.g., Keller v. Clark Equip. Co., 715 F.2d 1280 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. 
denied, 464 U.S. 1044 (1984) (applying de facto merger exception); Gamradt v. 
Fed. Labs., Inc., No. 02-CV-816, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16187, ¶ 16,741 (D. 
Minn. Sept. 2, 2003) (stating that four common law exceptions continued despite 
Minnesota Statutes section 302A.661, subd. 4); Huray v. Fournier NC 
Programming, Inc., 2003 Minn. App. LEXIS 620 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003) (applying 
mere continuation exception); Modern Fence & Mfg., Inc. v. Action Enters., Inc., 
1994 Minn. App. LEXIS 60 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994) (applying fraud exception); see 
also N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Landmark Dev. Corp., Nos. C1-92-2006, C7-92-2298, C4-
92-2534, 1993 WL 152157 (Minn. Ct. App. May 11, 1993) (regarding questions of 
fact that caused court to reverse lower court’s grant of summary judgment to 
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Johns afforded the Minnesota Supreme Court an opportunity 
to address the question of the continued vitality of the four 
common law exceptions to non-liability of transferees directly.139  
Remember, as visualized by the supreme court, the relationship 
between Jillian’s and the horizontally combined Gators entities 
looked like Figure 7. 
 
Figure 7: Jillian’s Relationship with the Combined (Solvent) Gators 
Entities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The issue of successor liability law, what the majority of the 
Minnesota Supreme Court called the “heart of the case,”140 was 
whether Jillian’s would be liable as a transferee of these combined 
entities under successor liability law.  As a matter of Minnesota 
successor liability law, both the majority and dissent agreed in their 
restrictive interpretation of Minnesota law and the rejection of the 
four common law exceptions to transferee non-liability.  The 
majority held: 
Minnesota successor-corporation law, as codified by 
 
plaintiff on issue of whether transfer of assets constituted a de facto merger 
resulting in liability of transferee as a de facto successor corporation).  No other 
recent case has been found in which a Minnesota court suggested that an assets 
sale that would not otherwise result in transferee liability might be classified as a 
de facto merger creating such liability under the facts presented in the case.  In 
New York Life, substantially all of the transferor’s assets were transferred to its sister 
corporation, and the transferor then liquidated its remaining assets and ceased 
doing business.  Id.  The court determined that section 302A.661, subdivision 4, 
was inapplicable because the provision was enacted after the transfer of assets 
occurred.  Id. 
 139. In Niccum v. Hydra Tool Corp., 438 N.W.2d 96, 99, 101 (Minn. 1989), the 
Minnesota Supreme Court, while citing J.F. Anderson, affirmed summary judgment 
in favor of a transferee corporation, noting that Minnesota Statutes section 
302A.661, subdivision 4, indicates the Minnesota legislature’s intent to limit any 
extension of successor liability. 
 140. Johns III, 664 N.W.2d 291, 296 (Minn. 2003). 
JILLIAN’S
HARBORAGE I/
    (TSA  + 
FPM, Ltd.
APA) 
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statute, provides that “The transferee is liable for the 
debts, obligations and liabilities of the transferor only to 
the extent provided in the contract . . . .”  Minn. Stat. § 
302A.661, subd. 4 (2002); see also J.F. Anderson Lumber Co. 
v. Myers, 296 Minn. 33, 40-41, 206 N.W.2d 365, 370 (1973) 
(holding that when one corporation transfers its assets to 
another, the receiving corporation is not responsible for 
debts of transferor unless it agrees to assume these debts).  
Jillian’s did not have successor-corporation liability under 
Minnesota’s corporate law because Jillian’s carefully 
defined the liabilities it would assume, and debts such as 
Johns’ judgments were not among them.141 
There are several monumental aspects of this short section of 
the Minnesota Supreme Court’s majority opinion in Johns III.  Note 
first that the majority stated the rule of Minnesota successor liability 
just as it had been intended by the legislature when it adopted 
section 302A.661 of the MBCA in 1981; that is, that the transferee’s 
liabilities are defined by the contract between the transferor and 
the transferee.142  The court did not even qualify its statement by 
quoting the explicit exception in section 302A.661 for state statutory 
law, although clearly that exception could have applicability in the 
right situation.  Second, when the court made reference to its pre-
MBCA decision in J.F. Anderson Lumber Co. v. Myers,143 which had 
stated not only the general rule on non-liability for transferees, but 
also the four common law exceptions, the supreme court majority 
in Johns III clarified the holding of that case.144  The Minnesota 
Supreme Court majority in Johns III cites J.F. Anderson for the 
“holding that when one corporation transfers its assets to another, 
the receiving corporation is not responsible for debts of transferor 
unless it agrees to assume these debts.”145  Period.  No mention of 
any common law exceptions to that rule of non-liability is made, 
even though the “mere continuation” exception arguably could 
have been applied on the Johns facts.146  Third, when summarizing 
its holding as to Jillian’s non-liability under Minnesota successor 
liability law, the supreme court majority focused solely on the 
 
 141. Id. at 297. 
 142. Id. 
 143. 296 Minn. 33, 40-41, 206 N.W.2d 365, 370 (1973). 
 144. Johns III, 664 N.W.2d at 297. 
 145. Id. 
 146. This is clear because the Court found that “substantial continuity” 
between Jillian’s and its predecessors was demonstrated for purposes of Title VII 
federal successor liability.  Id. at 299. 
34
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 2 [2004], Art. 3
http://open.wmitchell.edu/wmlr/vol31/iss2/3
MATHESON (CB & CKI)-REFORMATTED 11/14/2004  5:28:26 PM 
2004] LIMITS OF BUSINESS LIMITED LIABILITY 445 
parties’ agreement, stating that “Jillian’s did not have successor-
corporation liability under Minnesota’s corporate law because 
Jillian’s carefully defined the liabilities it would assume, and debts 
such as Johns’ judgments were not among them.”147 
On this fundamental point of Minnesota corporate law, the 
supreme court majority and the dissent found agreement.  As the 
dissent summarizes: “The majority correctly points out that Jillian’s 
did not have successor corporate liability under Minnesota 
corporate law.  All of the companies here were properly registered 
to do business and they carefully defined the liabilities and debts 
they wanted to assume and appellant’s debts were not among 
those.” 148 
It therefore is fair to conclude that a unanimous Minnesota 
Supreme Court has conclusively determined that the concept of 
successor liability under Minnesota law is fundamentally a function 
of the agreement between the parties.  Parties to an asset transfer 
transaction can define their own allocation of liabilities, which will 
not only bind those parties, but also third parties, such as Ms. 
Johns, as well as the Minnesota courts.  Moreover, absent a finding 
of state or federal statutory law imposing greater obligations, a 
review of the agreement between the parties is determinative of this 
allocation. 
These conclusions are a tremendous benefit for parties 
negotiating asset transfer transactions involving Minnesota 
businesses.  The parties can negotiate their asset transfer contracts 
confident that their contractual liability allocations are 
determinative absent statutory law, such as federal environmental 
law or, as in the Johns matter, federal Title VII law, to the contrary.  
More important, parties to asset transfer transactions should be 
able to avoid costly and substantial litigation with third parties 
about the potential applicability of the four common law 
exceptions to transferee non-liability that pre-dated adoption of the 
MBCA.  On the basis of both the majority and the dissent in Johns, 
trial courts should summarily dispose of claims to apply these 
common law exceptions. 
2. Federal Successor Liability Law under Title VII 
The issue of Jillian’s potential successor liability under federal 
 
 147. Id. at 297. 
 148. Id. at 300. 
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Title VII law remained.  As the majority of the supreme court 
analyzed the issue, its finding of no liability under Minnesota law 
and its clarification of successor liability in Minnesota was 
important but not dispositive.  “In addition to successor-
corporation liability under Minnesota corporate law, a separate and 
broader concept of successor-employer liability has been 
recognized in federal decisions under Title VII.  Because Title VII 
provides an alternate basis for the judgments in this case, the 
federal doctrine of successor-employer liability must be 
considered.”149 
The U.S. Supreme Court first established successor employer 
liability in John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston.150  In that case, the 
issue was what effect a merger of two companies had on a union 
bargaining agreement.151  The successor employer refused to 
bargain with or recognize the union, and it refused to honor the 
bargaining agreement the union held with the predecessor 
employer.152  The Court stated that in cases involving federal labor 
policy, federal law controls.153  National labor policy requires 
certain protections for workers and those protections may limit the 
owner’s freedom to sell his or her company.154  National labor 
policy requires a balancing of employer and employee interests.155  
Considering that the Court ruled that the successor was required to 
arbitrate with the union under the bargaining agreement.156  The 
successor was not required to renew the agreement, but it did need 
to arbitrate with the union so that a settlement could be reached 
for all of the back pay and benefits that the successor had denied 
 
 149. Johns III, 664 N.W.2d at 297.  This conclusion is also consistent with the 
MBCA itself.  As the Reporter’s Notes to Section 302A.661 provide, “[o]f course, 
federal statutes may preempt this statute in certain areas of liability.”  REPORTER’S 
NOTES—1981 TO SECTION 302A.661 OF THE MBCA, at 298, 2003-04 Special 
Pamphlet, 298 (2003), reported in WEST’S MINNESOTA CORPORATION, LIMITED 
LIABILITY COMPANY, AND PARTNERSHIP LAWS (2004-05). 
 150. 376 U.S. 543 (1964). 
 151. Id. at 545. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. at 548.  The Court stated that state law may be used to aid in the 
development of appropriate principles or their application to the particular facts 
of a case, but ultimately, the law is federal and it supersedes any state laws.  Id. 
 154. Id. at 549. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. at 548.  While ordinary contract law would not hold a successor liable 
for something that it had not bargained for, collective bargaining agreements are 
not normal contracts.  See id. at 549. 
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the union members since the merger.157 
In its analysis of the case, the Court set out a two part test for 
determining whether a successor has a duty to arbitrate with the 
union.158 First, there must be a substantial continuity of identity 
between the business before and after the merger or change in 
ownership.159  Second, the successor must have notice of the 
employees’ claims so that the successor might consider them when 
bargaining with the predecessor.160 
Later cases affirmed the holding in John Wiley & Sons, Inc.161  
The federal circuits expanded the test in John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 
beyond NLRA cases into Title VII actions.162  The landmark case 
applying successor employer liability to Title VII cases was EEOC v. 
MacMillan Bloedel Containers, Inc.163  In that case, the court found 
that the similarities between the NLRA and Title VII warranted 
applying the same successor employer liability rule to both types of 
cases.164  Examining the breadth of successor liability in the labor 
context, the court set out nine factors to consider in a Title VII 
successor case.165  Since MacMillan, other federal courts have 
 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. at 551. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. See EEOC v. MacMillan Bloedel Containers, Inc., 503 F.2d 1086, 1089 (6th 
Cir. 1974); Johns III, 664 N.W.2d 291, 297 (Minn. 2003); see also Marc A. 
Tenenbaum, Fall River: The NLRB’s Expansive Successorship Doctrine, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 
181, 182-85 (1989) (discussing the history of federal successor doctrine). 
 162. See MacMillan, 503 F.2d at 1094.  Later cases followed the precedent set in 
MacMillan.  See Kevin W. Brown, Annotation, Liability under Title VII of Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e et seq.) of Employer, As Successor Employer, For 
Discriminatory Employment Practices of Predecessor, 67 A.L.R. FED. 806 (1984). 
 163. 503 F.2d 1086 (1974). 
 164. Id. at 1090 (stating “[w]e are of the view that the considerations set forth 
by the Supreme Court in these three cases as justifying a successor doctrine to 
remedy unfair labor practices are applicable equally to remedy unfair employment 
practices in violation of Title VII”). 
 165. Id. at 1094.  The nine factors set out by the court were: 
1) whether the successor company had notice of the charge, 2) the ability 
of the predecessor to provide relief, 3) whether there has been a 
substantial continuity of business operations, 4) whether the new 
employer uses the same plant, 5) whether he uses the same or 
substantially the same work force, 6) whether he uses the same or 
substantially the same supervisory personnel, 7) whether the same jobs 
exist under substantially the same working conditions, 8) whether he uses 
the same machinery, equipment and methods of production and 9) 
whether he produces the same product. 
Id. (citing Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Executive Bd., Hotel & Rest. 
Employees & Bartenders Int’l Union, 417 U.S. 249, 256-58 (1974); Golden State 
37
Matheson: The Limits of Business Limited Liability: Entity Veil Piercing an
Published by Mitchell Open Access, 2004
MATHESON (CB & CKI)-REFORMATTED 11/14/2004  5:28:26 PM 
448 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:2 
interpreted the MacMillan test so that the last seven factors actually 
form the first part of the two part test: substantial continuity of 
business operations.166  The second part of the test is notice of the 
claim.167 
The Minnesota Supreme Court analyzed the particular facts of 
Johns III under this two pronged test.168  For the majority of the 
supreme court, much of the groundwork for a finding of successor 
Title VII liability in Johns III had been accomplished by its 
horizontal piercing and combination of the three entities that 
comprised Gators before Jillian’s entered the picture.169  In 
examining the continuity of business operations, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court considered the entire Gators restaurant as the 
business.  The court argued that even though the owners of Gators 
were free to “unbundle the business into as many legal entities as 
they choose, the policies that underlie Title VII cannot be avoided 
by attempting to confine the ‘employer’ function to a limited entity 
 
Bottling Co., Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 414 U.S. 168, 170-71, 184 (1973); N.L.R.B. v. Burns 
Int’l Sec. Serv., Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 274, 280-81 (1972); John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 376 
U.S. at 551; N.L.R.B v. Interstate 65 Corp., 453 F.2d 269, 272-74 (6th Cir. 1971); 
N.L.R.B. v. Zayre Corp., 424 F.2d 1159, 1162 (5th Cir. 1970); Overnite Transp. v. 
N.L.R.B., 372 F.2d 765, 768 (4th Cir. 1967)). 
 166. See Rojas v. TK Communications, Inc., 87 F.3d 745, 750 (5th Cir. 1996); 
Musikiwamba v. ESSI, 760 F.2d 740, 751 (7th Cir. 1985); Bates v. Pac. Mar. Ass’n, 
744 F.2d 705, 710 (9th Cir. 1984); Howard v. Penn Cent. Transp., 87 F.R.D. 342, 
347 n.6 (N.D. Ohio 1980); EEOC v. Stephen T. Cox, Inc., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
25674, at *17 (M.D. Tenn. 2001); Brown, supra note 161, § 2. 
 167. Under Title VII, the notice factor requires that the injured employee have 
filed a claim with the EEOC prior to the transfer of company assets.  See Rabidue v. 
Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611, 616 (6th Cir. 1986) (citing Wiggins v. Spector 
Freight Sys., Inc., 583 F.2d 882, 886 (6th Cir. 1978) (holding that the successor 
employer could not be held liable because the plaintiff had not filed a claim with 
the EEOC prior to the company acquisition).  So, the Title VII notice requirement 
has two components for the employee to show successor employer liability: actual 
notice to the successor of the claim, and the filing of an EEOC claim prior to the 
transfer. 
 168. Johns III, 664 N.W.2d 291, 299-300 (Minn. 2003). 
 169. Id. at 299.  It is also important to note that under federal successor 
liability, the method of transfer is not determinative of whether a successor has 
liability.  Golden State Bottling Co., Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 414 U.S. 168, 182 n.5 (1973).  
The Supreme Court reasoned that the policies underlying the labor law doctrine 
of successorship allowed for a broader application of liability.  Id.  So while some 
states may limit successor liability based on the type of transfer conducted, federal 
doctrine does not distinguish between mergers, consolidations, and purchases of 
assets as long as the three pronged test for successor liability is satisfied.  Id.; Chi. 
Truck Drivers, Helpers, and Warehouse Workers Union (Indep.) Pension Fund v. 
Tasemkin, Inc., 59 F.3d 48, 49 (7th Cir. 1995). 
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that has no purpose independent of the business as a whole.”170  
Noting that the employees, managers, location, name of the 
restaurant, and menu all remained the same, the court ruled that 
as a matter of law, a substantial continuity of business operations 
was shown.171 
As to the notice requirement, Jillian’s did not contend that it 
lacked notice of the judgment against Harborage I.172  Jillian’s hired 
the employees who were involved in the litigation with Johns, 
including Harborage I’s human resources director.173  The court 
concluded that Jillian’s was aware of the judgment for Ms. Johns 
and had the opportunity to take that judgment into account when 
bargaining for Gators.174  The court ruled that Jillian’s had the 
proper notice required for successor liability to attach.175 
The Minnesota Supreme Court’s finding of federal successor 
liability under Title VII piggy-backed on its finding of horizontal 
piercing among the three original Gators entities.  Once combined, 
Jillian’s was involved in an asset transfer with them and the fact that 
FPM had been initially found not to be an “employer” did not 
prevent its being found to be a part of the enterprise entity that 
constituted Gators and to which Jillian’s succeeded. 
As the supreme court viewed the transactions between Jillian’s 
and the combined entity, “[b]y the combination of the APA and 
TSA, Jillian’s acquired control of all of the related entities.”176  As to 
Jillian’s claim that it should only be tied to FPM through the APA, 
the supreme court responded that “[a]lthough we do not fully 
understand the district court’s decision not to enter judgment 
against FPM, we do not regard this as fatal to successor-employer 
liability because . . . the judgment against Harborage I implicates the 
entire business of Gators, to which Jillian’s succeeded.”177 
 
 
 
 170. Johns III, 664 N.W.2d at 299. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. at 300. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id.  Because a judgment had already been entered in the case, the 
requirement for filing an EEOC claim was clearly met.  Johns had to file the EEOC 
claim before she could bring a suit against Harborage I. 
 176. Id. at 299. 
 177. Id. (emphasis added). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Johns v. Harborage I, Ltd. is a complex amalgam of facts and 
legal issues.  It provided the Minnesota Supreme Court with the 
opportunity to address several significant legal issues.  The result of 
that analysis provides some guidance for entrepreneurs and their 
counsel with respect to the limits of limited liability in the entity 
and transactional settings.  First, as to entity based limited liability, 
the court accepted the concept of horizontal veil piercing in order 
to legally reform a series of related entities to reflect their 
operational business enterprise reality.  Second, as to transactional 
based limited liability, the Minnesota Supreme Court clarified 
Minnesota successor liability law by limiting successor liability to 
only those obligations explicitly assumed by the parties and those 
imposed by state or federal statutory law.  As a matter of state 
successor liability law, application of the previously employed four 
common law exceptions is gone.  This is consistent with the 
Minnesota legislature’s intent in adopting the MBCA.  Finally, in its 
least remarkable action, the Minnesota Supreme Court applied 
federal Title VII successor liability law in a manner consistent with 
its application by the federal courts in other employment 
discrimination cases. 
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